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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
PRESUMPTION OF A LOST GRANT-A METHOD OF
REPAIRING THE CHAIN OF TITLE
The doctrine of presumption of a lost grant can, in many cases, be
applied for the purposes of settling a disputed title. In the absence of a
previous deed or grant from the first grantor in claimant's chain of title, it
is a general rule that long-continued, undisturbed possession of real
property, accompanied by the usual claim and acts of ownership, or by
other corroborating circumstances, justifies the presumption of a lost
grant of the property in question to the claimant or his predecessors in
title. A presumption of a lost grant may be operative even though the
"adverse" claimant is the United States, a state, or a municipality.
Richard v. Williams' is one of the earliest cases to discuss the nature of
a lost grant.
Presumptions of this nature are adopted from the general infirmity of human
nature, the difficulty of preserving muniments of title, and the public policy
of supporting long and uninterrupted possessions. They are founded upon the
consideration, that the facts are such as could not, according to the ordinary
course of human affairs, occur, unless there was a transmutation of title to, or
an admission of existing adverse title in, the party in possession.2
In discussing the lost grant, most courts base their reasoning on the case
of Fletcher v. Fuller.3 Therefore, a detailed examination of this case is
very helpful in understanding the presumption of a lost grant.
The case of Fletcher v. Fuller held that it was error to refuse to instruct
the jury that the presumption of a lost deed was not necessarily restricted
to what might fairly be supposed to have occurred, but rather encompassed
what might have occurred and seemed necessary to quiet title in the
possessor. An analysis of Fletcher v. Fuller indicates that the Court, in
applying the rules as to presumption of lost grant, concerned itself with
several factors:
(I) The possessor of land is probably in possession under a deed or other
muniment of title which has been mislaid or lost. This conclusion is
reasonable since owners of real property do not usually allow others to
possess such property for a long period of time and exercise acts of owner-
ship over it, without permission or consideration. 4 (2) Actual proof of
120 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 59 (1822).
2 Id. at 49-51. See also 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 231 (1936).
3 120 U.S. 534 (1887).
4 1d. at 545-6: "The owners of property, especially if it be valuable and available,
do not often allow it to remain in the quiet and unquestioned enjoyment of others.
Such a course is not in accordance with the ordinary conduct of men. When, there-
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the execution is not necessary, it is sufficient if the conveyance might
have been executed. 5 (3) If not rebutted, the presumption of a lost grant
is so strong that the jury may be instructed that it is their duty to presume
such a conveyance. 6 (4) In order for the presumption to obtain the
possession must have been "actual, open and exclusive for the period
prescribed by the statute of limitations to bar an action for the recovery of
land... . ,, (5) Possession of the property can occasionally be interrupted,
if, in addition to possession, there were other open acts of ownership and
the interruptions "did not impair the uses to which the possessor sub-
jected the property ....
fore, possession and use are long continued, they cieate a presumption of lawful origin,
that is, that they are founded upon such instruments and proceedings as in law
would pass the right to the possession and use of the property. It may be, in point
of fact, that permission to occupy and use was givn orally, or upon a contract of sale,
with the promise of a future conveyance, which parties have subsequently neglected
to obtain, or the conveyance executed may not hive been acknowledged, so as to be
recorded, or may have been mislaid or lost."
5 Id. at 547: "It is not necessary, therefore .... in order to presume a conveyance,
to believe that a conveyance was in point of fact executed. It is sufficient if the evi-
dence leads to the conclusion that the conveyance might have been executed and that
its existence would be a solution of the difficulties arising from its non-execution."
In Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 2E3 Fed. 150, 195 (5th Cir. 1922), the
court states that it is sufficient if the execution of such a conveyance was "legally pos-
sible." Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh, 126 F.2d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 1942), specifically says
that, "actual proof of an execution of a conveyance is not necessary." See also supra
note 1.
6 Supra note 3, at 555: "Our conclusion is, that the claim to the land in controversy
by the defendants and their ancestors in title, for over a century, with the payment
of taxes thereon, and acts of ownership suited to the condition of the property, and
its actual use for thirty-six or twenty-eight years, ir matters not which, would justify
a presumption of a deed to the original ancestor, Jeremiah Richardson, to quiet the
possession of the defendants claiming under him, and the jury should have been per-
mitted to presume such a deed without finding from -the testimony that there was
in point of fact a deed which was lost. If the execution of a deed was established,
nothing further would be required than proof of its contents; there would be no
occasion for the exercise of any presumption on the subject. It is only where there
is uncertainty on this point that the presumption is indulged to quiet the possession."
7Supra note 3, at 551. Possesion has been held 1y most courts to be a necessary
prerequisite before the doctrine of presumed grant will be applied. In Mission of the
Immaculate Virgin v. Cronin, 143 N.Y. 524, 38 N.E. 964 (1894), the court refused to
presume a grant stating there was no actual or constructive possession which the claim
would characterize.
8 Supra note 3, at 552: "This presumption may, therefore, in some instances, be
properly invoked where a proprietary right has long been exercised, although the
exclusive possession of the whole property, to which the right is asserted, may have
been occasionally interrupted during the period necessary to create a title by adverse
possession, if in addition to actual possession there were other open acts of ownership."
Williamson & Brown Land & Lumber Co. v. Mullias Lumber Co., 249 Fed. 522, 526
(4th Cir. 1918), gives us another view as to the courts' interpretation of possession:
"The successive possession for 20 years gives rise to the presumption of a grant to
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In broad outline, the above discussion furnishes the basis for a presump-
tion of lost grant. Through the years, the courts have developed more
specific elements which must exist before a lost grant will be presumed.
In a discussion of these elements, however, it must be remembered that
each court applies its own standards, making it impossible to set forth,
with any certainty, the prerequisites which are necessary before a grant
will be presumed. Indeed, the value of the doctrine of lost grant is
enhanced by the flexibility of its application. But, in general terms, it is
helpful to consider what various elements have been deemed necessary
by certain courts.
Most courts agree that color of title is not necessary. 9 However, the
possession must be "adverse." It is not sufficient if possession is consistent
with the permission of the holder of proper title.10 And possession, while
it is an essential element, is not of itself determinative, even when ac-
companied by use. But possession and acts of ownership in connection
with other evidence may serve to establish a title by grant, as such evidence
renders it probable that an actual conveyance was made.'1 There must
be actual or imputed knowledge to the opposing party. Courts express
this idea by saying that there should be acquiescence on the part of the
ostensible owner which is best evidenced by nonclaim.12
For the most part, courts demand that the claimant use the land and
exercise acts of ownership over it. This can take various forms, such as
the first taker at the beginning. Starting with the first taker, the successive adverse
possessions may be tacked to make out the full period of 20 years from which a good
title is presumed in the last taker against all persons who are strangers in title to the
successive possessors in privity with each other claiming the land as their own. This
rule, that the possessions of successive holders in privity with each other for 20 years,
though without formal deeds of conveyance from one to the other, is sufficient to
confer good title on the last holder .. "
9 Keel v. Sutton, 142 Tenn. 341, 219 S.W. 351 (1920). "Possession of land is prima
facie evidence of title; the law supposes that it had a legal origin, and when undisturbed
for a period of 20 years, it becomes, in view of law, an assurance of title of no less
force or efficacy than the actual grant whose place it supplies." Cannon v. Phillips,
34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 118, 120 (1854).
10 Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh, 126 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1942); De Laine v. De Laine,
211 S.C. 223, 44 S.E.2d 442 (1947).
11 Tierney v. Second Ecclesiastical Society of North Canaan, 103 Conn. 332, 130 Atl.
286 (1925). In Cahill v. Cahill, 75 Conn. 552, 54 Ad. 201 (1903), the court stated that
the possession and acts of ownership are admitted as secondary evidence of an actual
conveyance of which the original and best evidence is lost. In other words, the evi-
dence is admitted because it renders it probable that there was an actual conveyance.
12 Love v. Eastham, 137 Tex. 462, 154 S.W.2d 623 (1941). In Abel v. Abel, 245
Iowa 907, 65 N.W.2d 68 (1954), the court said that because the title holder must
have knowledge of the possession and of the claim being made, no presumption of a
grant could arise when the title holder is an insane person, confined in a state hospital.
;,430
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fencing, cultivation, payment of taxes, et getera. In Koonce v. Woods,'3
the court presumed that there had been a redemption from a 1923 for-
feiture, with no facts other than that the claimant had paid taxes from
1927 to about 1947 in the manner provided by law. In Trustees of Schools
v. Lilly,'14 the exclusive possession for eighty years, plus the fencing,
cultivation, and use of the land, and the prevailing reputation as to
the title in the neighborhood, together with payment of taxes for about
seventy-eight years was considered sufficient to establish the presumption
of a grant. The presumption was also operative in the case of Butler v.
Johnson,15 where evidence was given as to the sale and payment of the
purchase price by the claimant and possession by him for more than
seven years.
In general, then, it may be said that the claimant must be in possession
of the land exercising those acts which an cwner of land would normally
exercise, and there must be actual or impu:ed knowledge to the adverse
party. The main consideration, however, a; determined from an analysis
of the cases employing the doctrine of lost grant, is that the facts of the
case are not fit under the rule, but that the rule is applied to fit the
facts.
The existence of almost any type of document may be, and for the
most part has been, presumed by the courts in applying the doctrine of
a lost grant. The United States Supreme Court stated in 1899 that there
was hardly a species of act or document, public or private, that would
not be presumed in support of possession, and that: even acts of Parliament
and grants from the Crown could be presumed.' 6 The courts have taken
the words of the Supreme Court, literally, as can easily be seen from a
glance at the various documents which have been presumed by the courts.
The issuance of a land patent,17 an act of the legislature,' 8 the execution
of a power of attorney' 9 and a conveyance from a trustee to a successor
trustee20 have all been presumed. The presumption has also been applied
13 211 Ark. 440, 201 S.W.2d 748 (1947).
14 373 111. 431, 26 N.E.2d 489 (1940). 15 180 Ark. 156, 20 S.W.2d 639 (1929).
16 United States v. Chavez, 175 U.S. 509, 523 (1899).
17 Malone v. Long, 128 Md. 377, 97 Atl. 643 (1916), wherein the court presumed a
patent because the claimants had possessed the land in question since 1855.
18 Trustees of University of South Carolina v. City of Columbia, 108 S.C. 244, 93
S.E. 934 (1917). The court stated that after the lap;e of 20 years of continuous pos-
session, the law would presume consent of the legidature whether the statute could
be produced or not.
'9 Garner v. Lasker, 71 Tex. 431, 9 S.W.332, (1888).
20 Kirton v. Howard, 137 S.C. 11, 134 S.E. 859 (1926), wherein the court presumed
that the trustee, whose duty it was to divide the land, had made that division or that
the division had at least been made with his consent.
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where it had been necessary under the terms of a will that two executors
join in the conveyance and the deed was executed by A as executor,
and B as executor by A, attorney in fact.21 Where an unincorporated
religious society had been in possession of land for over thirty years
under a lost deed, it was presumed that title was legally conveyed to
trustees for the society's benefit, the society being unable to take title to
itself.22 All that was necessary for the presumption to be operative in the
above situations was the legal possibility that the grant might have been
issued.
It is the policy of some courts to limit the presumption of grants to
situations where possession has endured for a period analogous to that of
the statute of limitations. 23 But ordinarily the presumption of a lost grant
is not affected by the statute of limitations with regard to the duration
of time for which possession must be had in order to give rise to the
presumption. 24 In general, the statute of limitations does not apply
because presumption of a lost grant and adverse possession are of a
different nature. Under the doctrine of adverse possession when a party
has been in possession of land under a claim of ownership for more than
twenty years the statute bars the true owner from dispossessing the
claimant, though his possession may have been wrongful and without
right; he prevails only because the true owner has not seasonably asserted
his right of ejectment. 25 The basic distinction is that the presumption of
lost grant involves a presumption of the rightfulness of one's possession,
while the statute of limitations is only applicable by its terms-when the
possession is, apart from the statute, wrongful.26
It would appear that insofar as the presumption might be regarded
by some courts as a rule of law,27 calling for the finding of a grant with-
out regard to the actual belief of the jury, it must be supported by a
21 Glenn v. Walker, 113 S.C. 1, 100 S.E. 706 (1919), wherein the court stated that as
long as the deed appeared to be valid on its face, it was not essential to its validity
that the deed should recite the power under which the attorney acted.
2 2 Reed v. Money, -- Ark. -- , 170 S.W. 478 (1914).
23 Riffle v. Skinner, 67 W. Va. 75, 67 S.E. 1075 (1910).
24 Wadsworthville Poor School v. McCully, 11 S.C. (Rich.) 424, 430 (1858): "The
presumption is independent of the Statute of Limitations; it applies to subjects not
within the statute, and it depends on principles which would operate if there were
no statute."
25 See Flannagan v. Mathieson, 70 Nebr. 223, 97 N.W. 287 (1903).
264 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1170 (3rd ed.). University of Vermont v. Carter,
110 Vt. 206, 3 A.2d 533 (1939).
27 See Koonce v. Woods, 211 Ark. 440, 201 S.W.2d 748 (1947), wherein the court
said that after a long lapse of time, a grant by the State will be presumed, not as a mat-
ter of fact but one of law.
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possession of at least the period of the statute of limitations. However,
when the presumption involves merely an inference of the making of a-
conveyance from the fact of possession, taken in confiectiofiwith other-
circumstances,2 8 a period less than the statute of limitation may be used
in aid of the inference. In effect, the presumption of a lost grant has'
the force and effect of a prima facie case and temporarily relieves the
party in whose favor it arises from presenting further evidence. It is like
all other presumptions of the law, a conclusion which may be 'rebutted.29
The value of the presumption of lost grant can be best seen when'
rights of the sovereign are involved. It is clear that the statute of limita-
tions does not run against the United States, the state, or municipal
corporations.30 Therefore, the statute of limitations will not avail the
claimant of title, no matter how protracted his possession, in a suit against.
the sovereign.3' An individual, however, can get relief by employing-
the presumption of a lost grant, primarily because it is not based. on-
adverse possession.
Many courts have allowed the use of the presumption of lost grant
against the government. In the case of United States v. Chavez,32 the
title was deficient in direct evidence, and the question was whether the
possessionof'the land over a long period of ti 'me supplanted'the deficiency/.
Possession for more than a hundred years 'was proved to -have been
respected by Mexico before the territory wis ceded to the United 'States.
The Court stated that although neither limitation nor prescription runs
against the United States government, a grant will be presumed when
there is uninterrupted possession for twenty years. In another case, the
Supreme Court stated that the presumption of lost grant will be applied
"as a presumptio juri et de jure, wherever, by possibility, a right may be
acquired in any manner known to the law. '' 3
Uninterrupted possession of land for fifty years, with payment of
taxes during the period, was held to be sufficient to warrant a presumption
of fact that the state had made a grant of land, in the case of Carter v.
Stewart.3 4 In the case of Schmeltzer v. Scheid,3 5 the court in emphasizing
28 Supra note 10, at 574: "The presumption of an ancient grant is not one of law;'
it is rather a rule of evidence which depends upon questions of fact."
29 In Illinois, it is considered a rebuttable prsumrtion of fact. See supra note 14.
30United States v. Burnette, 103 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. N.C. 1952); Wilkinson v.
Watts, 309 Ill. 607, 141 N.W. 383 (1923); Engel v. United States, 258 F.2d 50 (6th
Cir. 1958).
3
1 Ahart v. Wilson, 211 Ky. 682, 277 S.W. 1007 (1925). See also supra note 26.
32 175 U.S. 509 (1899).
33 United States v. Chavez, 159 U.S. 452, 466 (1895).
34 149 Ark. 189, 231 S.W. 887 (1921). 35203 Ark. 274, 157 S.W.2d 193 (1941).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the state's policy of protecting rights of individuals, who in good faith
pay taxes, presumed a lost grant from the state. To'wnsend v. Bonner30 is
another case in which the claimant's primary evidence of ownership was
that he had paid taxes. The court stated that as the property could only
have been entered on the tax books through the action of officers charged
with duty, it was reasonable to presume a grant from the state.
For the most part, courts allow the presumption of a lost grant to
operate against the government because of the injustice to the individual
if there was in fact a grant and such was lost due to the negligence of a
governmental official. The Arkansas Supreme Court expressed this idea
very aptly in the case of State v. Taylor.3 The State of Arkansas, in this
case, brought separate suits in ejectment against Taylor and others. The
court in denying the suits said:
The record shows that the person from whom Grady purchased the lands
bought from the purchaser at the sale, and a preponderance of the evidence
shows that the purchase money has been paid. Therefore, it was the duty of
the state, through its proper officers, to make the purchaser a deed to the
land, and it could not take advantage of its default in this respect to recover
the lands.38
The Supreme Court of Illinois allows a grant to be presumed against the
state because of the distinction between a title by statutory limitations,
and a title by lost grant. The court said the doctrine of lost grant was a
rule of evidence and that rules of evidence apply to the State and any of
its subdivisions in the same way as to any other litigant.39
United States v. Fullard-Leo40 is the case which best enunciates the
reasons why courts allow the doctrine of lost grant to be employed against
the sovereign. The court stated:
The presumption of a lost grant to land has received recognition as an
appropriate means to quiet long possession. It recognizes that lapse of time
may cure the neglect or failure to secure the proper muniments of title, even
though the lost grant may not have been in fact executed .... The rule applies
to claims to land held adversely to the sovereign. . . . A claim for govern-
ment lands stands upon no different principle in theory so long as authority
exists in government officials to execute the patent, grant or conveyance. As
a practical matter it requires a higher degree of proof because of the difficulty
for a state to protect its lands from use by those without right.41
The doctrine of the presumption of a lost grant, when traced to its
foundations, is a rule of convenience and policy, the result of a necessary
30 205 Ark. 172, 169 S.W.2d 125 (1943). 39 Supra note 14.
37 135 Ark. 232, 205 S.W. 104 (1918). 40 331 U.S. 256 (1947).
38 Id. at 107. 41 Id. at 273-274.
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regard for the peace and security of society. The rule is mainly used to
quiet disputes as to title in the manner which the evidence indicates to
be equitable. The courts are disposed to apply when possible the same
rules to public bodies that they apply to private individuals. Thus the
doctrine of lost grant should come to assume an even more important role
in the quieting of titles, whether the disputants be public or private.
Shelmerdeane Miller
